![]() ![]() Justice Rehnquist would have recognized no protected First Amendment rights of corporations because, as entities entirely the creation of state law, they were not to be accorded rights enjoyed by natural persons. The decision, addressing a question not previously confronted, was 5-to-4. Bellotti that corporations are entitled to assert First Amendment speech guarantees against federal and, through the Fourteenth Amendment, state, regulations causes the evaporation of the supposed “conflict” between speech clause protection of individuals only and press clause protection of press corporations as well as of press individuals. but the Court’s decision in First National Bank of Boston v. 323 (1974), intimations of such leanings by the Court. 111, 133 n.16 (1979), the Court noted that it has never decided whether the Times standard applies to an individual defendant. To be sure, in all the cases to date that the Supreme Court has resolved, the defendant has been, in some manner, of the press, 9 Footnote In Hutchinson v. Justice Stewart argued that the Sullivan privilege is exclusively a free press right, denying that the “constitutional theory of free speech gives an individual any immunity from liability for libel or slander.” 8 Footnote Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 Hastings L. The most interesting possibility lies in the First Amendment protection of good-faith defamation. What difference such “sensitivity” might make in deciding cases is difficult to say. Yet the Court has also suggested that the press is protected in order to promote and to protect the exercise of free speech in society at large, including peoples’ interest in receiving information. ![]() at 582–84 (Justice Stevens), 586 n.2 (Justice Brennan), 599 n.2 (Justice Stewart). 555 (1980), imply recognition of some right of the press to gather information that apparently may not be wholly inhibited by nondiscriminatory constraints. Several concurring opinions in Richmond Newspapers v. at 568 (Justice Powell concurring) Branzburg v. Yet, it does seem clear that, to some extent, the press, because of its role in disseminating news and information, is entitled to deference that others are not entitled to-that its role constitutionally entitles it to governmental “sensitivity,” to use Justice Stewart’s word. “Generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects.” 5 Footnote Cohen v. 663 (1991) (newspaper’s breach of promise of confidentiality). 153 (1979) (defamation by press) Cohen v. 547 (1978) (search of newspaper offices) Herbert v. 665 (1972) (grand jury testimony be newspaper reporter) Zurcher v. Nor, in many respects, is the press entitled to treatment different in kind from the treatment to which any other member of the public may be subjected. The trial access cases, whatever they may precisely turn out to mean, recognize a right of access of both public and press to trials. ![]() at 16 (Justice Stewart concurring) Saxbe v. Several Court holdings do firmly point to the conclusion that the press clause does not confer on the press the power to compel government to furnish information or otherwise give the press access to information that the public generally does not have. The Chief Justice’s conclusion was that the institutional press had no special privilege as the press. But, as Chief Justice Burger wrote: “The Court has not yet squarely resolved whether the Press Clause confers upon the ‘institutional press’ any freedom from government restraint not enjoyed by all others.” 2 Footnote 435 U.S. 765, 798 (1978) (Chief Justice Burger concurring). Other articles are cited in First National Bank of Boston v. Justice Stewart initiated the debate in a speech, subsequently reprinted as Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 Hastings L. The Constitution requires sensitivity to that role, and to the special needs of the press in performing it effectively.” 1 Footnote ,Houchins v. Justice Stewart has argued: “That the First Amendment speaks separately of freedom of speech and freedom of the press is no constitutional accident, but an acknowledgment of the critical role played by the press in American society. It has been much debated, for example, whether the “institutional press” is entitled to greater freedom from governmental regulations or restrictions than are non-press individuals, groups, or associations. Some have raised the question of whether the free speech clause and the free press clause are coextensive, or whether one reaches where the other does not. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. ![]()
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